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11. Galbraith and the political economy
of technological innovation: 




In The New Industrial State (NIS), Galbraith (1967) develops a unique
approach to understanding the management of technological innovation. It is
based on a critical evaluation of the decision-making processes of economic
agents within institutions and how they react to the different levels of political
power in society. This political economy (PE) approach to technological
innovation is the overriding theme of this chapter and is in direct contrast to
the plethora of books and articles that provide a technocratic approach to
managing technological innovation.1 There has been an appalling lack of any
PE analysis of technological innovation in the spirit of Galbraith since NIS.
Kingston (1984) is one notable excellent exception. The extremely poor level
of citation of the Kingston book in the twenty years after its publication is a
reflection not of the quality of the work, but with the obsession with
technocratic issues within the business management discipline. In the
meantime, mainstream neoclassical economics refuses to look inside what
Rosenberg calls ‘the black box’ of technological innovation despite all econo-
mists recognising the crucial role that it plays in economic development.2
Technological innovation has many definitions in the innovation literature.
For the purposes of this chapter, the following is most appropriate: The
creation, development and implementation of an idea from problem-solving or
opportunity identification that alters (innovation) the current state of
theoretical and practical knowledge, skills and artefacts in the production and
delivery of economic activity (technology). Technology here refers to any
production and delivery processes that require a significant input of fixed
capital investment.3 In the context of innovation, technology matters because
it is the engine that drives change and economic growth. This is in response to
society’s needs or in the conceiving of new economic opportunities that
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induce demand. Without effective demand generating the commercialisa-
tion of new technology, the idea remains merely an invention without
exploitation.
Underlying the incessant drive in capitalism to technological change, are the
agency processes of technological innovation that bring about this change.
These agency processes needed to be clearly understood and appreciated for
policy relevance to the public, private and third (non-profit) sectors. The
scholarly works related to technological innovation have many ideological and
functional intentions, leading to diverse perspectives on agency that have little
in the way of overlap and even less dialogue between them. The PE approach
in this chapter will provide a set of common evaluating criteria to assess
critically all the perspectives. 
A political economy approach that initiates this investigation is set out first,
along with the evaluating criteria. Then the role of technological innovation in
capitalism from the pro-market perspectives (neoclassical and neo-Austrian)
establishes the historical basis of the individual capitalist–entrepreneur agent
effecting change. Galbraith provides a critical response from which to
appreciate the development of large corporate agency in technological
innovation. This critical response comes from three perspectives that have
adopted some aspects of Galbraith’s NIS – institutionalists, resource-based
strategists and post-Keynesians. The various perspectives are briefly outlined
and critically assessed on the basis of the evaluating criteria. The final section
identifies key common themes that exist across the perspectives outlined and
proposes a heterodox synthesis that unifies these common themes around a
Galbriathian framework of analysis.
2. POLITICAL ECONOMY APPROACH
The parameter that sets up this PE approach is the dynamic model of
technological change based on Marx’s laws of motion. Essentially, the
circulation process under capitalism must overcome the limits of production
by expanding over the barriers of declining additions to surplus value time
(Lallier 1989). This determines the drive to technological innovation in three
forms: (1) opening up new markets, (2) creating new needs and demands, 
(3) investment in increasingly technologically efficient means of production.
These forms are endogenously linked to instability, unemployment, inequality
and unsustainable development that create an economy with fundamental
uncertainty. In fact, it is the attempt to ‘control’ this uncertainty that drives all
the perspectives. This control comes from the agents that are given power in
their respective perspectives (be it capitalists, entrepreneurs, technostructure,
firm, creative elite or politicians).
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Crucially, the economic agents of institutions are the central decision-
making actors in the process of technological innovation. These agents have
the power to affect the way society adapts to such innovations in three ways:
(1) ability to determine the nature of the technology employed; (2) monopoly
power that resides with the entrepreneurs who install the innovation that 
can stifle other innovations as well as promote their own, (3) force society
through organisational (politics), property (rights) and individual (charisma)
elements to adopt the innovations they promote. This power view of
innovation has two dimensions. One is the power to manipulate production 
in a way that technological innovation alters the physical aspect of the
economy. Adam Smith, followed by Ricardo and Marx, developed this
dimension around specialisation (Smith), employment (Ricardo) and
exploitation (Marx) on the basis of what happens to the economic surplus
(Dasgupta 1985, p. 15). The other is the power to manipulate demand in a way
that promotes one innovation while stifling another. Sraffa (1926) first
recognised the power of marketing, which was subsequently developed by
many economists, but notably Robinson (1933), Sylos-Labini (1962) and
Galbraith (1958).4
The perspectives will be examined with two objectives in mind. The first is
to appreciate the limits to innovation. These limits are specified by each
particular perspective with each identifying the role of business planning and
public policy in overcoming these limitations. The second is to identify
common themes that could form the basis of a general framework of
technological innovation. This framework has a Galbraithian base as it
encompasses the uncertainty principle by institutions that handle the tension
between planning strategies and unconstrained environments.
The innovation process is the generation of ideas and their implementation
(often called ‘commercialisation’ when it occurs in a private sector business
environment). Jolly (1997) calls this the process of getting ideas from the
‘mind to the market’, and he identifies in his research five interconnected
stages in the process:
● Imagining – which generates technological solutions with problem-
solving skills.
● Incubating – which develops concrete applications of the technological
solutions.
● Demonstrating – which tests designs and validates outcomes of
technological applications.
● Promoting – which positions the demonstrated technology into
appropriate market(s).
● Sustaining – which improves functionality through incremental
improvements.
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The various perspectives examined below emphasise different aspects of
this five-stage innovation process, and the articulation of these perspectives
will be in the context of the aspects of this process which each perspective
concentrates its analysis.
Seven factors make up the criteria that are applied to appreciating the role
of technological innovation and its influence on the society. Each perspective
is examined to see which of these factors are specified and the role that they
play in the innovation process as identified by Jolly (1997). The seven factors
are:
1. Source of creativity in the imagining and incubating stages;
2. Bridging the invention–innovation gap to fund and technically support the
demonstrating stage;
3. Promoting the technological applications for the diffusion of innovation;
4. Role of investment and effective demand in sustaining the innovation;
5. Contextual analysis related to firm size, regional location and industrial
sector;
6. Trend and cycle patterns in the laws of motion for innovation;
7. Role of government in relation to the whole technological innovation
process.
3. PRO-MARKET PERSPECTIVES
The agency that is central to the determination of technological innovation in
neoclassical economics is ‘The Market’. The firm is seen as reflecting the will
of the market determined through contracts of exchange, with economic
agents carrying out the dictates of the market. This agency perspective is
consistent with market dominance developed by economics writers in the
marginalist revolution post-1870. The Walrasian general equilibrium system
describes a pure exchange economy without any consideration of production.
The Marshallian partial equilibrium system attempts to integrate the theory of
exchange with a production system anchored in industries that are made up of
a set of heterogeneous firms (Best 1992, p. 4). Industries, not firms, are central
to the determination of price and quantity through the interplay of supply and
demand forces in each industry setting. Any advantage gained by one firm
quickly spills over to other firms in the same industry evening out the
industry’s firms. Bloch and Finch argue that:
Despite irreducible heterogeneity among firms in often localised and clustered
industries, the tendencies that prevent one firm from getting a lead and benefiting
from faster accumulation or internal economies mean that the famous representative
firm of Marshall’s principles has some (logical) credence or tractability. (2004, p. 5)
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The source of creativity is in the market itself, or in Marshall’s terms it is
‘in the air’. The knowledge inherent in innovation ‘leaks out’ quickly and
easily through communication of customers, suppliers, rivals, educational
institutions, etc.. This spillover occurs around localised districts (or clusters)
in Marshall’s world, but this can extend to electronic networks and globalised
strategic alliances (including franchising and licensing). Innovation gradually
builds upon previous knowledge and its diffusion is very quick and effective.
Incentives through early technical knowledge are brief, with first-mover
advantage the longer-term objective. Source of innovation is, thus, exogenous
to operation of the market. That is why Nelson and Winter (1982) use random
draws for innovation knowledge in their simulation model of enterprise
development.
Bridging the invention–innovation gap is problematic from the neoclassical
perspective, because the market works on the basis of information spreading
quickly (if not instantaneously) to enable the innovation knowledge to diffuse.
The process of bridging the gap is not of significance per se; only when market
forces are prevented from diffusing the information is there a legitimate reason
for passive public policies to dissuade such prevention. Promotion through
advertising and other marketing techniques is important in differentiated
markets, but only as a temporary competitive advantage to be whittled away
by competitors marketing strategies. The criterion of investment in sustaining
innovation is essential but not a driver of innovation, only a response to the
market situation. The market is the power.
The contextual criterion in neoclassical economics is crucial in the
Marshallian strand that has influenced generations of industrial organisation
researchers. This is the biological analogy of firms as trees, where they 
‘… gradually lose vitality; and one after another they give place to others,
which … have on their side the vigour of youth’ (Marshall, 1920, p. 316). This
implies that firms do grow, but then decay, so that no firm becomes too large
over a long time so as to dominate the industry. The role of regional clustering
and industrial location is linked to this biological need to group together in
order to be sustainable. This sustainability is only in a quasi-equilibrium state
such that there is ‘…dynamic balance between progressive and declining
firms, with today’s progressives inevitably becoming tomorrow’s decliners’
(Bloch and Finch 2004, p. 5). This analogy also provides a trend around an
equilibrium stationary state position for the ‘forest of firms’ as a whole, with
the representative firm providing some medium firm in this industry, with 
only exogenous shocks like radical disruptive technologies disturbing the
‘biological’ balance. Trend is the statical balance with heterogeneity being
competed away quickly. Any major disturbances causing cycles are
exogenous shocks to the system.
The role that government plays in the innovation process in neoclassical
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economics is passive and reactive. Any exogenous shocks and distortions that
threaten the biological balance need to be addressed by policies that ensure the
stability of private investment decisions. This stability derives from the state’s
attention in establishing the ‘benchmark’ competitive conditions that lead to a
stable market-based economy (for example legislation on: anti-trust, consumer
protection, anti-discrimination, intellectual property rights). These benchmark
conditions allow the price signals to arise, and for them to be the basis upon
which private entrepreneurs respond. This benchmarking begins from the
premise that human agency responds to flexible market signals by tending
towards a known (or at least knowable) equilibrium stable condition. The
dynamic aspect of this neoclassical position is the exogenous element of
technological innovation. It is such technology that is assumed will come
forward under correct market signals. This innovation is seen as being
appropriated via investment, but with no specific theory on how it happens.
Empirical evidence on technical change comes forth as only a ‘residual’ to all
the basic internal static economic factors that are explicitly price responsive
(see Denison 1962). 
Critical response to this neoclassical view of innovation centres on the
dilemma of limits to innovation. On the one hand there are no limits because
price signals will always respond to shortages in the market, stimulating
technological innovations that will overcome such problems. On the other
hand, the fact that technological innovation is merely a residual in the
economic model makes any efforts to understand, model and act on any
specific conditions impossible. This limits innovation to purely the outcome of
the ‘invisible hand’. The uncertainty principle inherent in this perspective
cannot be addressed except in some fundamental commitment to the market
faith, the signals it creates and the quick responses elicited.
The underlying critical response to this market faith is that technology 
itself, within the context of volatile market signals creates conditions 
for uncertainty in expectations about the future that lead to cumulative short-
run instability and cumulative long-run systemic change. The work by 
Minsky (1982) on financial instability and by Crotty (1992) on growth–safety
trade off in capital goods investment, show the cumulative volatility arising 
from market signals to investment (both financial and physical). Recent 
work on technology embodied in investment has shown the rise of severe
cyclical activity whenever new technological systems predominate.5 When
technology becomes embedded, then past technology decisions shape 
future investment decisions and myopic selection pressures operate. Such
pressures work against the automatic price response mechanism that would in
theory induce new appropriate technology; for example, replacement
technology for the petrol-driven automobile (Rip and Kemp, 1998, pp. 
372–9).
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A pro-market variation to the neoclassical view comes from the 
neo-Austrians who see the agency that is central to the determination of
technological innovation as ‘The Entrepreneur’. The entrepreneur is seen as
alert to opportunities for taking advantage of discrepancies and gaps in the
market system.6 In this sense, the neo-Austrian version of the entrepreneur is
an arbitrager; a persona embodying foresight, knowledge and willingness to
act in situations of widespread ignorance of the disequilibria that exist in the
market that comes out of the criticism that the neoclassical position lacks any
subjective human element to agency (Canterbery 1995, p. 262). Exploiting
opportunities in a rational planning manner adds to the value of the final
product by the techniques that are ‘put to use’. The more capital-intensive the
process of production, the more capital goods are put to use through
increasingly complex techniques and the higher market price that the product
can command. Value is thus added by the ‘degree of roundaboutness’, leading
to capital deepening in the economy (Kirzner 1973). The appropriation of
monopoly power in the market is evidence of creative and successful
entrepreneurship. Such monopoly power is not seen as permanent by neo-
Austrians unless such power is underwritten, subsidised and otherwise
supported by governments and their regulatory agencies. 
Promoting the innovation provides the competitive advantage, similar to
neoclassical economics. As an arbitrager, the neo-Austrian entrepreneur
identifies and reveals the ends latently demanded in the economy. Marketing
is merely the process of informing market participants of the opportunities
created by entrepreneurs. Any monopoly power that is established from
marketing will be slowly undermined in the marketplace rather than the 
quick response assumed by the neoclassical version of this promotion 
story.
The neo-Austrians have a strong accumulation link from innovation to
investment, and it is driven by the entrepreneur’s need to produce the final
marketable product. Effective demand is latent and always waiting for the
entrepreneur to exploit. The investment process continually alters the structure
of capital, where this capital is the only factor of production and embodies
anything that the entrepreneur invests in (human, physical, natural or social)
to produce the final product (Kirzner 1976). Contextual relevance to this
entrepreneurial process centres on Schumpeter (1934) and the role of small
innovative firms developing the creative niche in capitalism that is the
bulwark of technological innovation, which reflects the capitalism of the
nineteenth century. The laws of motion are governed by the actions of the
entrepreneur, with cycles being the subjective reflections as well as signals of
these actions. Surveillance of market-created rules under the principles of
private property is the one role of government in the process of innovation 
and economic development. Laissez-faire is rationally necessary for
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entrepreneurship to flourish, with judicial outcomes protecting private
property rights being the centrepiece of public policy.
For the neo-Austrians, innovation is only limited endogenously by the
imagination and creativity of entrepreneurs and exogenously by the heavy
hand of government restraining opportunities through regulation. Both
limitations are subjectively bounded by the operation of individual creativity
and by the negative reaction of entrepreneurs to regulation. There is 
much research on the most effective ways of unlocking the creative potential
for business (e.g. Amabile 1997) but this does not provide a model of
creativity that can be used to understand economic development of the
innovation process, nor an appropriate comparator of different innovation
systems. There is also no guidance for public policy for innovation, since
subjective individualism drives innovation.7 Uncertainty underlies finding
opportunities and delivering outcomes. This is the crucial dynamic element
that drives the entrepreneur, but it is not analysed in a way that would facilitate
the better handling of uncertainty for potential entrepreneurs. Thus, it is 
not clear whether entrepreneurial actions will deliver the desired outcomes.
Examples of actions by entrepreneurs in the corporate collapses of the 
early 2000s (‘tech wreak’, Enron, WorldCom, Martha Stewart) indicate 
that optimum social outcomes may not always result (see Clarke et al. 
2003). 
The pro-market perspectives outlined above view market signals as the
dynamic of capitalism. Whereas the neoclassical mainstream adopts an
objective commitment to market processes; the neo-Austrians base their
market faith on a subjective nature of human action. Both have an approach 
to innovation that harks back to the individual entrepreneurial economy of 
the nineteenth century. Power of the entrepreneur is dominant in these
perspectives, either implicitly (neoclassical) or explicitly (neo-Austrian),
while the effects this power has on civil society in monopoly capitalism is
ignored, especially in terms of the lack of both transparency and ethical
responsibility. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, this approach can
be a rationalisation for capitalist excesses in a globalised economy where the
rule of national law is becoming much more tenuous.
Although the classic entrepreneur still exists, empirical evidence suggests
‘…that only a minority of new companies survive, and that these are often 
not particularly innovative’ (Sundbo 1998, p. 157).8 The innovation process
has become institutionalised since Thomas Edison introduced the research 
and development department into his innovation of a longer-lasting light
globe. Technological innovation has to a large extent become organised,
‘managed’ and taught in MBA programmes (see note 1). This opens the 
door for Galbraith to provide an institutional approach to technological
innovation. 
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4. GALBRAITH AND THE INSTITUTIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE
The rise of big business in the twentieth century moved the dynamic of agency
away from the individual entrepreneur. NIS provides a way of understanding
this dynamic on technological innovation by recognising the laws of motion
within the large corporations, but incorporating into this trajectory a strong
agency story. The agency that is central to the determination of technological
innovation in NIS is ‘The Technostructure’. The technostructure is seen as the
decision-making basis of the large corporations that forms ‘the planning
system’ of advanced capitalist economies and which guides economic
development. This agency group embraces specialised knowledge, talent and
experience in specific technology-based areas where the market system (and
its small enterprises) is symbiotically subservient to the decisions of large
corporations, while governments need to acquiesce to the planning system’s
power and influence. NIS developed this large firm dominance approach from
Schumpeter (1942), where the small firm entrepreneur of Schumpeter (1934)
gives way to a managerial class who are concerned to protect and support
increasingly sophisticated technology in a planned approach. Power lies with
the technostructure inside large corporations who serve partly the capitalist-
owners through share price and dividend sustainability, with increasingly
generous serving to themselves via remuneration packages and perquisites of
office (Stilwell 2002, p. 232).
NIS forms the basis of a critical institutional school response to the power
of big business. Galbraith in NIS reaches back to the seminal early works of
Thorstein Veblen and linking with contemporaries like Clarence Ayres.9
Although clearly having an institutional focus, NIS has a sophisticated
methodological enquiry that is evolutionary, emphasising the role of major
institutions in shaping economic and social development. In the context of
technological innovation, it is the technostructure that is the major agent of
change that results in corporate dominance, environmental stress, deep
military–industrial complex, financial instability, as well as globalised market
and cultural penetration. All this can be described as an interlocking complex
set of innovation systems operating at global, national and sub-national (or
regional) levels.10
Sources of creativity in technological innovation are a two-edged sword
from this perspective. The technology imperative demands from the
technostructure two actions. First, the technostructure needs to stifle
competing radical innovations from individual entrepreneurs of the classic
neo-Austrian variety (see Lessig 2004). Second, the technostructure needs to
commit funds for internal research and development (R&D) in the incremental
innovations of existing corporate technologies (see Chiesa 2001). These two
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actions tend to limit innovation to what a bureaucracy can produce in a
planned system, underlying a certain hard-core level of technological
determinism. Schumpeter (1942) expressed concern that the dynamism of
innovative entrepreneurship will be eroded by the technostructure sheltering
their large corporations from ‘the gales of creative destruction’. 
The large corporation bridges internally the investment–innovation gap by
first funding R&D and then commercialising the projects that are deemed by
the technostructure as having the potential for success (see Jolly 1997). This
leads to circular and cumulative causation,11 where the dynamic forces of
innovation support certain forms of innovation to the detriment of other
innovations. Self-perpetuation through monopoly control in the physical
dimensions of innovation leads to a virtuous cycle of incremental innovation
by large corporations. This is perpetuated in MBA courses that develop
models for managing technological innovation (e.g. Ettlie 2000). On the 
other hand, there is also the vicious cycle of disadvantage, prejudice and 
legal constraints that prevent the investment–innovation gap from being 
met by funds and other support. Support to traverse this gap does not easily
trickle down to small innovative entrepreneurs (see Kingston 1984; Lessig
2004). 
Galbraith (1958) develops the concept of producer sovereignty to replace
consumer sovereignty, the neoclassical term to express consumer choice in the
market. Under a planning system, the large corporation needs to reduce
fundamental uncertainty of new innovations by channelling huge resources
into market research (or ‘wants-creation’ process) and developing a marketing
plan that creates product acceptance and brand loyalty. This is the promotion
aspect of innovation from the institutional perspective. The acceptance of a
strong consumerist ethos is a necessary pre-condition for producer sovereignty
to work in the aggregate. There will always be specific examples of failures in
marketing, but its overall success is evident from the continual development
of consumerism both in advanced economies and now spreading through to
strongly developing economies like China.12 Galbraith often quips: ‘It is the
exception that proves the rule.’
Another cumulative causation aspect emerges with the role of investment
and effective demand in innovation. Heilbroner (1961, p. 263) identifies that
capitalism’s investment rests on the shoulders of technological progress alone,
which carries with it an inherent instability:
The great inventive contributions of mankind had always come in sudden bursts: an
era of industrial revolution; an era of railroadization; an era of electrification;
another of automotive building [and yet another era of information technology
building – JC]. Each cluster of inventions had resulted in a spurt of investment, but
when each had run its course, the hectic activity of building was succeeded by a
period of quiescence.
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This instability of innovation has been dubbed the ‘clust-bun’ effect;
clustering of inventions leads to bunching of investment to intensify existing
business cycle activity. The virtuous ‘clust-bun’ effect requires effective
demand stimulus through widespread diffusion of the clustering phenomenon
that can only be achieved through the availability of profits for investment
determined by the technostructure, often politically and financially supported
by public sector funding.13
Impediments to the ‘clust-bun’ effect reside in the institutional frameworks
of nations (national innovation systems), particularly the ones with still-
dominant mature industries utilising older technologies (Freeman and Perez,
1988, pp. 58–65). Increased uncertainty arising from large investment in the
new technology systems also adds an impediment through increased
macroeconomic volatility, which Toivanen et al. (1999) empirically identify
as slowing down the diffusion process. R&D (and technology transfer thereof)
provides large corporations with the potential means to overcome these
impediments and set up their own national innovation systems, with profits
determining the volume of R&D that firms can undertake. Thus, the size of
firms will reflect how successful the technostructure is in overcoming
impediments in their own terms. The greater this success, the larger and
stronger monopoly control will be exerted by large corporations. Then, there
would be less space for small enterprises to prosper, unless they are
symbiotically linked to the large corporations (e.g. component makers for
automobiles and computers). This provides a clear and consistent adaptation
and modification to Galbraith’s technostructure concept in the light of
capitalist developments in technological innovation since publication of NIS.
The cumulative causation process has a regional inequality dimension to it.
So, firms that cluster in one industrial location, strongly supported by one or a
few large corporations, create strong regional innovation systems. Meanwhile,
peripheral industrial regions without large and expanding corporations will
tend to lose their entrepreneurial people to strong cluster regions. This is what
Myrdal (1957, p.27) calls the ‘backwash effects’ in regional economies, from
an economic development perspective.
In the classic evolutionary proposition by Schumpeter (1939) the invest-
ment function responds to waves of optimism and pessimism to create clusters
of inventions, which then are diffused through the bunching of investment: the
‘clust-bun’ effect. This leads to investment cycle patterns and the development
of a trigger mechanism to significantly increase the rate of investment in
endogenous (incremental) innovation on the basis of a specific exogenous
basic (or radical) innovation already created by the established large
corporation. At the bottom of the investment cycle a trigger to initiate a
‘virtuous cycle’ effect occurs with investment rising to diffuse basic
innovation. This increases the amplitude of the expansion phase of the
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investment cycle, raising innovation intensity and shifting the trend path of
economic growth upward.14 An opposing ‘vicious cycle’ effect works to
reduce innovation intensity, thus sending the investment cycle into a
significant contractionary phase.
From NIS, the role of government in technological innovation is to support
the technostructure through the educational and scientific estate made up of
teachers and researchers in schools, universities and non-profit research
centres. Their intellectual work and social organisation ‘are woven into the
work of big corporations, which provide research funds, endowed chairs, and
lucrative consultancies in exchange for these valuable new technologies and
techniques’ (Parker 2005, pp. 440–1). This estate generally does not challenge
the order of the corporate planning system and is bound to it by mutual love
of what Galbraith called ‘technological virtuosity’ and the social prestige it
engenders. 
Galbraith’s institutional perspective is strongly based on a public sector
interventionist position. The political power imbalance clearly needs to be
addressed by reformist public policies that aim to provide more balanced
development by supporting regions, industries, unions, communities and
independent innovators that do not have the support of the technostructure.
The innovation policies need to be active and positive in the direction of
encouraging variety, fostering experimental behaviour, supporting new
developments, focusing on system building, enhancing diffusion, promoting
learning organisations and their skills training, as well as assisting to influence
expectations (through broad-based grants, tax concessions, mentoring, and
supporting small business services).15
The major contribution from this perspective is the holistic approach to
analysis and policy, recognising interdependencies with dynamic evolutionary
forces. This requires complex economic dynamics that can identify systemic
(rather than market) failure and interventionist policies to overcome such
failures. Many examples of success in this innovation approach can be noted:
war-based economy, reconstruction from major devastation (e.g. the Marshall
Plan), national sports-based academies, regional clustering around universities
and technology parks. 
Four major criticisms of the institutional perspective can be identified: 
(1) Given the large monopoly planning power of the technostructure it is
unclear how a government can escape from their acquiescent policy
framework into the more balanced approach advocated by these economists.
In fact, this planning power will ensure that any ‘balanced’ attempts will be
skewed to favour the large corporations through special interest lobbying and
pleas by neoclassical economists of the erroneousness of profligate state
spending on picking ‘so-called’ winners. (2) The vast majority of job creating
companies are fast-growing start-ups (or gazelles), independent of the
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technostructure (Birch et al. 1999), especially with the downsizing of large
corporations through the 1990s. (3) Affluent electoral majorities in advanced
capitalist economies are enjoying the fruits of a consumerist society and 
no longer look to government for social betterment of society in a balanced
way, but instead demand security to protect their materialist gains from 
what Galbraith calls ‘the underclasses’ that exist both inside and outside
national borders (see Lasch 1995). (4) Technological and historical
determinism that underlies the advance of innovation is being undermined by
the higher-order strategic planning process of professional managers, leaving
the middle level technicians to work at a purely operational level (see Sundbo
1998, p. 116). 
5. GALBRAITH AND THE RESOURCE-BASED 
PERSPECTIVE
The four criticisms of the Institutional perspective above can be directly
addressed by the resource-based view (RBV) that centres on the strategic
organisation of the innovation process. The agency that is central to the RBV
is ‘The Firm’. The firm from this perspective is an administrative unit that
develops a ‘life’ of its own and is not distinguished from the actors who
operate inside this organisation. Penrose (1959) is the major inspiration for
this perspective that has now become the mainstream perspective in the
business management discipline.16 The focus is on the firm’s internal develop-
ment through a dynamic capabilities framework, without explicitly
establishing an innovation theory. Competitive advantage is seen not from the
firm’s interaction with the external market, but instead based on coordinating
and combining the following core competences: distinctive assets, specific
processes and critical know-how.17 All three are developed from learning-by-
doing in a path-dependent way that produces increasing returns. This destroys
the fiction on constant returns that neoclassical economics depends on to
deliver an equilibrium position.
Galbraith is seen from this RBV perspective as supporting the technocratic
role of the professional manager, separating ownership from management and
developing a internal organisational structure based around strategic planning
(Sundbo 1998, p. 141). Galbraith uses this internal corporate structure to focus
on the politico-economic role of large corporations on the external society,
while Penrose focuses on how corporations organise their internal resources.
In the process, the RBV is consistent with an acquiescent political system, a
consumerist society and strategic (rather determinist) core. Penrose also
provides a clear growth process for independent start-ups to becoming large
corporations, something Galbraith does not entertain.
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The source of creativity in the RBV perspective comes from the ability of
the firm to gather together distinctive core competences. This starts with
management of the imagining stage to generate ideas (see Amabile 1997),
right through to the sustaining stage of the idea over the long term (see Jolly
1997). What ultimately limits innovation is the capacity of the firm’s
management to implement and learn from the five-stage innovation process.
Organisations need to develop behavioural patterns and habits called
‘routines’, in order to make decisions on future actions. These routines are
based on a repertoire of skills that evolve over the life-cycle of the
organisation as learning and selection occur.
Bridging the invention–innovation gap is an integral part of the manage-
ment’s ability to work through the first three stages of the innovation process.
Growth of the firm comes from the ability to free up internal resources so as
to create managerial services for new diversified opportunities. This is more
important than engaging in zero-sum games with competitors like price
discounting, cost-cutting, downsizing and developing barriers to entry; since
competing firms will retaliate with similar actions that will rebound on the
initial instigator.
The promotion of innovation through marketing is seen as just another of
the core competences that needs to be effectively managed. In fact, it is argued
that market position in the context of rapid innovation is extremely fragile 
and difficult even to identify. ‘Moreover, the link between market share and
innovation has long been broken, if it ever existed’ (Teece et al. 1997, p. 319).
Considering the role of investment in the innovation process, it is surprising
that this aspect is not discussed in any great detail by this perspective.
Consistent with RBV, investment is seen as a capital budgeting process that
shapes both the introduction of new capital stock into the firm and also the
decommissioning of old capital stock. The management process for capital
budgeting involves traditional net present value calculations, together with
developing a portfolio of investment opportunities and calculating the option
value of participating in new technology – contingent on competitor behaviour
(Ettlie 2000, p. 192). 
Whereas the previous perspectives clearly specified the firm size of
innovation champions, RBV follows Penrose in identifying the precise
circumstances and actions of the firms that determines innovation champions.
Scherer warned in 1980 (p. 418) that ‘[t]he search for a firm size uniquely and
unambiguously optimal for invention and innovation is misguided’. There is
strong theory and evidence to support both small and large firm innovation
propensity. In fact, medium-sized firms tend to be the most disadvantaged,
since they lack the dynamism of small entrepreneurship and the wherewithal
of large firms to conduct R&D. However, ‘[un]equivocal evidence is found
that [market] concentration exerts a negative influence on the number of
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innovations being made in an industry’ (Acs and Audretsch 1991, p. 14). This
means that innovations can emerge as much from small firms as from large
firms, thus industrial and regulatory policies cannot be based on simple rules
about firm size but more related to market power through high concentration
in particular industries. In general, the role of government is active supportive
(e.g. removing monopoly rents), but not in the positive reformist approach of
the institutional perspective.
Collaborations between firms are a crucial element of the learning process
in RBV and recent studies have identified the technological and marketing
innovative benefits that emerge (see Coombs et al., 1996). Networking from
collaborations by (and with) small and large firms has significant implications
for regional clusters (or industrial milieux) both in geographic and cyberspace.
In this way, innovation diffuses over space through the process of knowledge
spillovers that operate at different rates of diffusion across technology gaps.
The laws of motion that this perspective concentrates on relates to the
evolution of technological innovation. The initial approach was the life cycle
(or S-curve) from birth to decay (or transition). Since then more sophisticated
approaches have emerged for large firms, particularly punctuated equilibrium
and jolt theory; whereas small firms still tend to resemble the neoclassical
‘forest of firms’ (Ettlie 2000, pp. 76–82).
The constructive elements of this perspective come from the hard-nosed
empirical research underpinning the concepts outlined, using specific
measures of innovation and coming up with practical strategies for the
management of innovation. Planning, thus, is seen as a cooperative process in
tune with market reality – linking markets with the planning system. On the
negative side, RBV ‘is still too undeveloped to function as a unified basic
theory’. (Sundbo 1998, pp. 157–8), and despite its empirical disposition, many
measures used are acknowledged as unsatisfactory, especially in trying to
identify innovations themselves and the core competences that create them
(Acs and Audretsch 1991). Core competences can also be limiting when 
they become core rigidities and then firms underestimate or neglect emerging
core competences arising in the economy. This leads to ignoring market
demand, leading to the problem of effective demand and its limitation on
innovation. From this emerges the most critical factor, essential in
Galbraithian institutionalism, that there is the lack of power as a crucial
element in the innovation process, despite the occasional reference to market
concentration strength as a negative influence on innovation. One aspect that
could reflect a fresh angle on power is the neglected notion of an ‘innovation
mechanism’ by Downie (1958), ‘whereby laggard firms have a greater
incentive (the need to survive) to undertake risky R&D work that might
provide them with ways to re-establish their competitive position’ (Bloch and
Finch 2004, p. 12).
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6. GALBRAITH AND THE POST-KEYNESIAN 
PERSPECTIVE
A macroeconomic perspective on the technological innovation process is
lacking in all the previous perspectives. Their emphasis is on the industrial
organisation of innovation. Galbraith’s own Keynesian predilections gave him
a strong effective demand macroeconomic view, but this has never been
wedded to his technostructure and the political economy of technological
innovation. A small group of economists working in the Kalecki–Steindl
tradition have made a significant contribution to the macroeconomic demand-
oriented aspects of technological innovation that helps to appreciate the
economic development and volatility of modern neo-liberal capitalism. On the
scale of technological determinism, this contribution is further to the soft end
than the institutional or RBV perspectives because of its emphasis on the
power of capitalists’ own behavioural decision-making. 
The agency that is central to the determination of technological innovation
is ‘The Capitalist’. The capitalist links innovation to investment decision-
making so that the elements of effective demand and cyclical volatility at the
broad base are related to the cumulative processes in all forms of innovation
at the firm/industry level. This perspective derives from Keynes (1936) and his
clear view that investment (in capital stock) is the essential, but
‘undependable’ drive wheel for the economy. Co-progenitor of the post-
Keynesian perspective, Kalecki, identifies the historically determined
profit levels as generating the ability to invest in capital goods and in
innovation knowledge enhancement. Profits (or surpluses in non-profit
organisations and public authorities) not only provide the wherewithal to
invest, but also through their extension of the capital funds owned by the
organisation (‘entrepreneurial capital’), it also allows for access to loans 
and share issues (‘rentier capital’), which can further extend capital and
knowledge-based investment (Kalecki 1991, p. 279). 
Capital accumulation is embedded in the endogenous (or induced)
innovation generated from within the organisations (via R&D expenditure,
and knowledge spillovers). Such innovation is of secondary importance from
the scientific standpoint, coming as it does from: (1) slight adaptations on
previous capital equipment; (2) cosmetic improvement in old products; and 
(3) extension of previous raw material sources. Kalecki calls the ‘innovation
effect’ a ‘development factor’ which creates the following dynamic process:
innovations prevent the system from settling to a static position and engender a
long-run upward trend. The accumulation of capital, which results from the fact that
long-run investment is above the depreciation level, in turn increases the scope of
the influence of the development factors and thus contributes to the maintenance of
the long-run trend. (1991, p. 327)
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Kalecki, then, sees ‘exogenous’ innovation as representing the intensity of
innovation with given capital investment levels. This means that any change
in the intensity of the innovation effect originates in the scientific invention or
basic business opportunity identified as the source of the innovation. So 
that a:
reduction in the intensity of innovations … will also initially cause a disturbance in
the cyclical fluctuation and, by means of a slump more pronounced than the boom,
will make for a lower long-run level of investment. (Kalecki 1991, p. 328)
This would lower the long-run trend, where an increase in innovation
intensity would raise the long-run trend in economic growth.
R&D amounts in aggregate to a large body of investigation going on
continuously (at different rates of intensity). This large R&D spending and
related innovation effects are bound to lead to some major new ‘discovery’ or
‘invention’ which is related to the total aggregate R&D, rather than any one
particular R&D project. This discovery is linked to possible small develop-
ments in various laboratories and informal networks between firms and
industries, eventually coming to fruition in some way divorced of any specific
competitive behaviour. New technological paradigms come out of such
aggregate developments and are the basis of structural change to a new long
wave of boom and prosperity (Freeman and Perez 1988, pp. 47–58). Changes
in technological systems and paradigms arise only after all the minor improve-
ments (endogenous innovation) are squeezed out of the old systems and
paradigms by ‘monopoly capital’ entrepreneurs who want to protect existing
capital stock and delay the new paradigm taking over. There is also ‘log jam’
in endogenous innovations based on the new paradigm which compounds the
latter’s slow initial adoption. This occurs when established powerful
capitalists, with much old capital stock, cannot justify the entire shake-up of
industries, since not enough interrelated clusters have been formed. 
As the Galbraithian institutional framework slowly adapts to the new
technological system, capitalists’ reactions against uncertainty of profits come
from competitive pressures and growing inefficiencies of old capital stock.
This induces adaptation (by industries) and imitation (within industries) to
technological trajectories that are totally new, establishing the new investment
upturn. It is creating a new investment boom and at the same time re-
establishing the conditions for a new phase of steady development. A
paradigm shift occurs when the new adapted technological systems pervade
the whole economy. 
This analysis links together the two types of innovations described by Baran
and Sweezy (1966), namely ‘normal’ (or endogenous) and ‘epoch-making’ (or
exogenous). A period of secular decline in economic development can now 
be associated with the limitations of scale production in oligopolistic
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competition, as the old technology systems are running out of possible new
adaptations. Diffusion of the old systems through endogenous innovation
slows down and imitators become considerably fewer. The large powerful
corporations attempt to protect existing capital values and ignore the new
technological systems being developed on the fringe of the corporate world.
This tends to exacerbate the mismatch between new technologies and
powerful institutional framework based around monopoly capital. It was
Steindl, back in 1952, who recognised this secular decline as the incentive to
reduce surplus capacity and invest in established monopoly capital sectors. In
his 1976 introduction to the 1952 book reprint, Steindl stated that he was
‘ready to admit a possibility which I denied in my book: that it might be the
result of exhaustion of a long technological wave’ (1976, p. xv). 
Courvisanos (1996, pp. 225–30) outlines in detail three public policies: (1)
demand management to regularise investment cycles at the macroeconomic
level; (2) encouraging innovation into new technological systems at the
microeconomic level; (3) ‘socialisation of investment’ through perspective
planning at the mesoeconomic level as countervailing power to the planning
system of monopoly capital. The post-Keynesian perspective provides a more
short-term demand-oriented response to innovation policies, but it is the lack
of a broader institutional aspect to innovation that limits the post-Keynesian
position. Ignorance of the roles of competition (neo-Austrian) and
collaboration (resource-based) in the innovation process opens up the criticism
that despite the appropriate demand conditions and public support, without
these two dynamic elements of firm innovation, the innovation process could
be heavily compromised as it was during the command economy period of
Eastern European economies (see Marangos, 2004).
7. A GALBRAITHIAN HETERODOX SYNTHESIS
Galbraith and NIS provide the impetus for a heterodox analytical framework
for technological innovation.18 Galbraith’s institutional base provides an
effective PE critical response to the pro-market perspectives on technological
innovation, but at the same time giving a level of technological determinism
to the innovation process that raises concerns for its viability as a complete
framework. The work of resource-based strategists at the internal organisation
level and post-Keynesian economists at the macro policy level has the
potential to develop a more comprehensive and less determinist framework.
The intellectual support of Galbraith and his NIS thesis in the RBV and post-
Keynesian perspectives as they relate to innovation can be incorporated into
the Galbraithian institutional framework. The following themes form the basis
of this heterodox synthesis:
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● Endogeneity: Innovation arises from within the system with recursive
effects and increasing returns, and is not some exogenous or
independent force. Galbraith recognises that through the technostructure
innovation is generated and then efforts are applied to manage the
process.
● Uncertainty: Need to ‘manage’ uncertainty is crucial for the innovation
process. The pro-market perspectives have mechanisms that assume the
change agents can handle uncertainty automatically. The Galbraithian
element in all the three other perspectives develop more open-ended
approaches to uncertainty, identifying various political, social and
corporate elements that ‘manage’ uncertainty through strategy, power
and influence.
● Evolutionary: Innovation is a process of change that evolves from 
some embryonic revolutionary idea to different types of innovation:
infant (radical), growth (incremental), maturity (stagnant) and then
either declines or transforms (diversifies). Dynamic mechanisms are
developed by all the three critical market perspectives to address
implications of evolution.
● Individualism: A person (or team) drives the innovation process through
entrepreneurship. The process can be based on competitive and/or
collaborative arrangements in the commercialisation of the innovation.
Galbraith identifies the technostructure and the collective organised
teams (e.g. R&D departments) within large organisations that drive
innovation, but the RBV also recognises employees as champions (or
intrapreneurs) who are catalysts.
● Strategic planning: Managing and strategising innovation in a planned
approach is a strong antidote to the idea that it just happens by the power
of individualism. This shifts the innovation process from psychological
(individual) and technocratic (scientific) to organisational and
marketing; a process begun by Galbraith. 
● Investment: Where the pro-market perspectives see investment only as
some automatic response to market signals. Empirical evidence on the
basis of sound Keynesian principles shows that investment decision-
making is needed to deliver technological innovation in a mass capitalist
economy. This requires basic post-Keynesian foundations related to
profits, debt and productive capacity (see Courvisanos 1996). 
● Supportive state policy: The need for public policy to support the
innovation process is recognised explicitly (institutional and post-
Keynesian) and implicitly (RBV and neo-Austrian). The differences
relate to questions of passive versus active intervention and the
underlying reasons that the state is ‘induced’ to provide this support.
Neoclassical, neo-Austrian, and RBV (to a less extent) see public policy
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as needing to be passive while ignoring the PE reasons for its support.
The institutional response is strong in terms of PE and the need for
reformist active intervention, despite the fundamental contradiction
identified earlier. Post-Keynesians have strong active support but
without the political–institutional depth of Galbraith. Some studies have
combined institutional and post-Keynesian elements into a public policy
framework to address these political economy concerns (see Freeman
and Perz 1988; Lima 2000; Courvisanos and Verspagen 2004).
8. CONCLUSION
A Galbraithian heterodox synthesis should provide a strong generic
framework to understand and appreciate the capitalist forces that underlie
technological innovation and its commercialisation process. A thumbnail
sketch of such a framework has been provided in this chapter. A deeper policy
analysis that emerges from this synthesis could form the basis of a substantial
development in strategic planning and public policy analysis. This could
provide improved ability to cope with the uncertainty that arises from the
dynamics of technological innovation and accompanying capital investment.
At the same time this generic framework can be used to take advantage of the
susceptibility of other firms in a dynamic competitive environment in order to
innovate and develop competitive strengths. Finally, such a synthesis enables
some rigorous guidelines to be established for further empirical research on
the political economy of technological innovation.
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NOTES
1. See books like Jolly (1997), Ettlie (2000), and Betz (2003). For selected significant articles
in this genre, see Tushman and Anderson (2004).
2. Rosenberg (1982) is an example of a strong historical approach to researching innovation
that has important implicit PE implications. See also Landes (1969), von Hippel (1988).
3. For example, opening up of new sources of raw materials requires enormous input of new
capital stock. Even the creation of a new organisational structure is technology-based if it
requires significant new capital equipment to make the reorganised structure work
effectively. This ‘new investment’ condition qualifies all the five innovation forms defined
by Schumpeter (1934, p. 66) into this definition of ‘technological innovation’. 
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4. Kingston (1984) provides (to my knowledge) the first attempt to synthesis these two
political economy dimensions to innovation. Sundbo (1998, p. 156) argues that at the end of
the twentieth century it is the marketing dimension that has become the greater challenge
and the driving force behind innovation.
5. Courvisanos (1996) has combined the Minsky and Crotty analyses to develop a
‘susceptibility cycle’ of investment at the agency behavioural level involving technological
innovation. Case study patterns provide support to this concept of cumulative instability. See
also Freeman and Perez (1988).
6. Neoclassical economists call such discrepancies and gaps ‘disequilibria in the market’. See
Kirzner (1973) for a modern-day exposition of Neo-Austrian entrepreneurship.
7. Hayek (1948) explains how little we know from an objective basis of human activity.
8. Sundbo (1998, p. 160) goes on to argue that ‘the number and significance of the
entrepreneurs compared with the large, complex companies have been weakened.’ The
global entrepreneurship monitor (GEM) of ‘entrepreneurial activity’ only shows new
business ventures out of necessity or opportunity identification (see Reynolds et al. 2002).
Although job creating in the short term, generally such ventures do not survive and do not
involve technological innovation, as identified in empirical studies quoted by Sundbo (1998,
p. 157).
9. Ayres (1952) has been described as a strong case of technological determinism. However,
Lawson (2004, p. 5) notes ‘on closer reading, as with Marx, the point that emerges is that
some technological development may be a necessary condition for some other technological
development (or indeed social development).’ Thus, technological determinism should not
be seen as some mechanistic operation. All technological change is contingent on how
technology is ‘shaped’ by human agency processes as social groups manage technological,
social and economic conflicts (MacKenzie and Wajcman 1985).
10. The dynamic forces of this complexity system approach to innovation are outlined in Bryant
and Wells (1998). On complex economic dynamics, see Rosser (1999).
11. This concept was originally outlined by Thorstein Veblen and developed across a broad
range of issues by Gunnar Myrdal (see Argyrous 1996).
12. For a recent evaluation of Galbraith’s work as it applies to fundamental uncertainty, see
Dunn (2001). For new psychology-based research that supports producer sovereignty and
the consumerist context, see Kahneman (1999).
13. See Courvisanos and Verspagen (2004) for empirical support on the ‘clust-bun’ effect.
14. See Toivanen et al. (1999) for empirical support on this virtuous cycle effect.
15. Modern neo-Schumpeterian economists spell out such policies in detail (see Bryant and
Wells 1998). For a neo-Schumpeterian overview from one of its leading lights, see Nelson
(1987).
16. A significant contribution to this perspective by economists working in this field is Dosi et
al. (2000).
17. This sidesteps entirely the planning versus market dichotomy that characterises the previous
perspectives.
18. Heterodox interface has become an important part of communication amongst many
nonneoclassical schools of economics; in an effort to develop dialogue, learn from
alternative approaches and find common threads of analysis. For example, the inaugural
conference of the International Confederation of Associations for Pluralism in Economics
(ICAPE), University of Missouri, Kansas City, June 2003).
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